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1.
EFSA J ; 21(2): e07822, 2023 Feb.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2274202

RESUMEN

The epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and animals is continually evolving. To date, animal species known to transmit SARS-CoV-2 are American mink, raccoon dog, cat, ferret, hamster, house mouse, Egyptian fruit bat, deer mouse and white-tailed deer. Among farmed animals, American mink have the highest likelihood to become infected from humans or animals and further transmit SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, 44 outbreaks were reported in 2021 in mink farms in seven MSs, while only six in 2022 in two MSs, thus representing a decreasing trend. The introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into mink farms is usually via infected humans; this can be controlled by systematically testing people entering farms and adequate biosecurity. The current most appropriate monitoring approach for mink is the outbreak confirmation based on suspicion, testing dead or clinically sick animals in case of increased mortality or positive farm personnel and the genomic surveillance of virus variants. The genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 showed mink-specific clusters with a potential to spill back into the human population. Among companion animals, cats, ferrets and hamsters are those at highest risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, which most likely originates from an infected human, and which has no or very low impact on virus circulation in the human population. Among wild animals (including zoo animals), mostly carnivores, great apes and white-tailed deer have been reported to be naturally infected by SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, no cases of infected wildlife have been reported so far. Proper disposal of human waste is advised to reduce the risks of spill-over of SARS-CoV-2 to wildlife. Furthermore, contact with wildlife, especially if sick or dead, should be minimised. No specific monitoring for wildlife is recommended apart from testing hunter-harvested animals with clinical signs or found-dead. Bats should be monitored as a natural host of many coronaviruses.

2.
Water Res ; 221: 118809, 2022 Aug 01.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1915078

RESUMEN

On November 26, 2021, the B.1.1.529 COVID-19 variant was classified as the Omicron variant of concern (VOC). Reports of higher transmissibility and potential immune evasion triggered flight bans and heightened health control measures across the world to stem its distribution. Wastewater-based surveillance has demonstrated to be a useful complement for clinical community-based tracking of SARS-CoV-2 variants. Using design principles of our previous assays that detect SARS-CoV-2 variants (Alpha and Delta), we developed an allele-specific RT-qPCR assay which simultaneously targets the stretch of mutations from Q493R to Q498R for quantitative detection of the Omicron variant in wastewater. We report their validation against 10-month longitudinal samples from the influent of a wastewater treatment plant in Italy. SARS-CoV-2 RNA concentrations and variant frequencies in wastewater determined using these variant assays agree with clinical cases, revealing rapid displacement of the Delta variant by the Omicron variant within three weeks. These variant trends, when mapped against vaccination rates, support clinical studies that found the rapid emergence of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant being associated with an infection advantage over Delta in vaccinated persons. These data reinforce the versatility, utility and accuracy of these open-sourced methods using allele-specific RT-qPCR for tracking the dynamics of variant displacement in communities through wastewater for informed public health responses.


Asunto(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Alelos , Prueba de COVID-19 , Humanos , ARN Viral , Reacción en Cadena en Tiempo Real de la Polimerasa , SARS-CoV-2/genética , Aguas Residuales/análisis
3.
EFSA J ; 19(3): e06459, 2021 Mar.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1115388

RESUMEN

American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.

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